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Ensuring Government Accountability During
Public Health Emergencies
Fazal R. Khan*
INTRODUCTION
Regardless of whether one agrees that it should have, 9/11 did trans-
form our country.  The opportunity to seize the moment and erect an “impe-
rial” or “unitary” executive branch of government was clear.  Right after the
terror attacks on this country’s financial and political centers, an unsettling
daze afflicted the nation’s capital.  The unthinkable had just occurred.  The
concept of national security, about which most Americans had rarely given a
second thought, was front and center on everyone’s mind.  Initially, the Bush
Administration received broad praise for reassuring the public that it was
safe and that a serious plan was in place to prevent further attacks.1  Only
later would we learn what this plan entailed—convincing the public that the
federal government needed unchecked power to keep the nation safe.  Yet
immediately after the attacks, a President previously plagued by dismal pub-
lic ratings and questionable legitimacy received the undivided support of his
country.2
The sense of restored calm in D.C. quickly evaporated following an
eerie bioterror attack that used the public mail system to deliver weaponized
anthrax.3  Federal workers flooded emergency rooms desperately seeking
ciprofloxacin, a broad-spectrum antibiotic.  Once again, the capital’s psyche
was unmoored from normalcy and set adrift on insecurity.  Amidst these
strange days, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) commissioned the Cen-
ters for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and The Johns Hopkins
Universities, headed by Lawrence Gostin, to draft the Model State Emer-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, specializing in Public
Health Law, Bioethics, and Healthcare Law and Policy; J.D., M.D. University of Illinois; B.A.,
University of Chicago.  Paul Heald, Dan Coenen, Lori Ringhand, Mujeeb Khan, and Saera
Khan provided helpful comments.  Lauren Peel provided invaluable research assistance.
1 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001); Elisabeth Bumiller,
Seeing is Believing; America as Reflected in its Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002, at C1.
2 President Bush’s job approval ratings skyrocketed from a pre-9/11 low of 51% on Sep-
tember 10, 2001 to his highest ever rating of 90% on September 21, 2001.  Gallup, Presidential
Job Approval Center, http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Job-Approval-Center.
aspx (click on Bush 2001–2009, then National Adults) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library); see also Bumiller, supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., John Lancaster & Susan Schmidt, 31 Exposed to Anthrax on Capitol Hill,
WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2001, at A01; see generally Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Amerithrax
Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
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gency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA).4  As the MSEHPA’s preamble explic-
itly acknowledges, its drafters were specifically reacting to 9/11 and self-
consciously invoking a new paradigm of public health as national security:
In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, our nation
realizes that the government’s foremost responsibility is to protect
the health, safety, and well being of its citizens. . . . Emergency
health threats, including those caused by bioterrorism and
epidemics, require the exercise of essential government functions.
Because each state is responsible for safeguarding the health, se-
curity, and well being of its people, state and local governments
must be able to respond, rapidly and effectively, to public health
emergencies. . . . [The Act] therefore grants specific emergency
powers to state governors and public health authorities.5
The feverish urgency of this effort was apparent as the initial version of the
MSEHPA was released publicly on October 23, 2001, at almost the same
time as the USA PATRIOT Act6 and while the Twin Towers were still
smoldering.
Constitutionally, states have broad public health powers, including the
ability to declare a public health emergency (PHE).7  A state’s declaration of
a state of emergency has traditionally served several important functions,
including triggering the release of monetary funds, the mobilization of per-
sonnel and equipment, the waiver of certain legal strictures, and the expan-
sion of executive powers.  Given this broad set of extant state emergency
powers, many public health law scholars have questioned the underlying ra-
tionale of the MSEHPA and the extraordinary powers it sought to grant to
states.
Critics singled out the following MSEHPA provisions, among others, as
especially problematic.  A state Governor can unilaterally declare a public
health emergency with no judicial oversight.8  The declaration allows the
state to conscript health care providers and facilities indefinitely and against
their will.9  It permits public health officers to coerce individuals to submit
to examinations and forced treatment on penalty of being quarantined or
criminally punished.10  It grants public health officials and those working
4 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law & the Public’s Health,
Discussion Draft 2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA], available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf.
5 Id. pmbl. at 6.
6 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
7 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–26 (1905); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-32-2104 (2006).
8 MSEHPA, supra note 4, § 401.  The Governor can renew such a declaration every thirty
days.  Further, the state legislature can only overturn such a declaration by majority vote in
both houses. Id. § 405(b)–(c).
9 Id. § 502(b).
10 Id. §§ 602(c), 604(a).
\\server05\productn\H\HLP\4-2\HLP205.txt unknown Seq: 3 17-JUN-10 12:29
2010] Government Accountability During Public Health Emergencies 321
under their authority broad immunity from liability, even for actions that
cause permanent injury or death.11  Additionally, the MSEHPA authorizes
the state public health authority to “waive any or all licensing requirements,
permits, or fees as required by the State code and applicable orders, rules, or
regulations for health care providers from other jurisdictions to practice in
this State.”12
In summary, critics have argued that the MSEHPA granted Governors
and state public health officials dictatorial powers.  In particular, George An-
nas, Wendy Parmet, and Wendy Mariner have stood out in their strong oppo-
sition to the MSEHPA.  They have argued that the MSEHPA is a reactionary
legislative proposal that is rooted in the fear and paranoia of an exceptional
historical event, and not in sound public health law policy.13  Further, they
have noted that granting the states extraordinary powers to respond to bioter-
rorism or massive PHEs seems misguided when such events would clearly
seem to be federal problems.14
When the Obama Administration took office in January 2009, some of
the leading critics of the MSEHPA and the Bush Administration policies
breathed a sigh of relief.  They expressed optimism that President Obama’s
renewed commitment to the rule of law signaled that the time was ripe to
move away from PHE policies based on a flawed national security para-
digm.15  This optimism was not unfounded.  The Obama Administration ex-
plicitly declared that no government official was above the law, and it
vowed to restore a culture of government transparency and accountability
and not to overlook civil liberties in the name of security.16  In other words,
the country was going to regain a sense of normalcy, rejecting the paranoid
stance of an emergency state.  Yet after a year and a half in office, President
Obama’s actions regarding civil liberties and government accountability
have not lived up to the substance and spirit of his initial rhetoric.
The main argument of this Article is that the gravest threat to civil lib-
erties during a PHE stems from federal powers premised on post-9/11 na-
11 Id. § 804.  This provision immunizes state actors from negligent tort liability, but not
from gross negligence or willful misconduct.
12 Id. § 608(b)(2).
13 See, e.g., GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC
HEALTH—NOT A LAW ENFORCEMENT/NATIONAL SECURITY—APPROACH 11–12, 16 (2008),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file399_33642.pdf; George J. An-
nas, Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1171,
1178–79 (2003) [hereinafter Annas, Puppy Love]; Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public
Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 283 (2005).
14 See Annas, Puppy Love, supra note 13, at 1181–82; George J. Annas, Bioterrorism,
Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1337, 1337, 1339 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Annas, Bioterrorism].
15 See Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule of Law, 1
DREXEL L. REV. 341, 341, 379 (2009).
16 President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html) (“And those of us who
manage the public’s dollars will be held to account, to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do
our business in the light of day, because only then can we restore the vital trust between a
people and their government.”).
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tional security justifications, not putative state powers under the MSEHPA.
While I concur with earlier assessments that the MSEHPA is seriously
flawed and that PHEs should be construed as primarily federal issues, going
forward, more critical attention needs to be focused on the federal role dur-
ing PHEs as the initially alarming MSEHPA appears to be more of a paper
tiger.  First, as the responses to Hurricane Katrina and recent flu pandemic
threats have demonstrated, the concept that the states’ police power will re-
main the locus of power during future PHEs is outdated.  Second, the federal
government possesses core security capabilities that enable surveillance and
detention measures unmatched by any state.  Third, and most importantly,
the Obama Administration appears to be normalizing a national security le-
gal framework introduced by the previous Bush Administration that grants
federal actors expansive powers to curtail the liberties of individuals with
correspondingly little accountability.
This Article advocates for balanced public health emergency policies
that both secure public safety and respect individual civil liberties.  As Presi-
dent Obama indicated in his inauguration address, these goals are not mutu-
ally exclusive.17  Arbitrary and abusive measures against individual and
group liberty are grave harms in and of themselves and are much more likely
to occur in the context of unaccountability.  In turn, reasonable fear of such
measures during an emergency will undermine trust and voluntary compli-
ance, which will only worsen the public health crisis.
Part I of this Article describes conditions that will make greater federal
involvement inevitable during future public health emergencies.  Part II ex-
amines the lasting danger presented by the convergence of national security
and public health emergency policies that occurred during the Bush Admin-
istration.  Given this convergence, Part III analyzes the Obama Administra-
tion’s position that official actions implicating national security matters are
beyond judicial review and suggests this stance is a cause for serious con-
cern in the context of public health emergencies.
I. WHY EMERGING PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES WILL INEVITABLY
BE CAST AS FEDERAL ISSUES
As a matter of constitutional law, public health has been construed as a
state rather than a federal issue.18  In this regard, states have significant
power to regulate individuals, groups, and property to protect and secure the
public’s health.  These powers include isolation (segregating individuals
known to have an infectious disease), quarantine (segregating individuals
with suspected or known exposure to an infectious disease), surveillance,
property condemnation, and compulsory vaccinations.19  One of the major
17 Id. (“As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and
our ideals.”).
18 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–26 (1905).
19 See generally MSEHPA, supra note 4.
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rationales given for drafting the MSEHPA was a need to “moderniz[e] pub-
lic health law” in response to “[n]ew and emerging dangers.”20  The
MSEHPA supporters presumed that existing public health laws were ill-
equipped to deal with new types of PHEs that could be anticipated after
9/11, and that the drafters responded appropriately to these modern realities
by greatly expanding the scope of state powers during a PHE.  It is ironic
that this “modernizing” effort was founded on a traditional understanding of
the states as the primary locus of power during a PHE.  While this view is
consistent with traditional notions of federalism and state police powers, it is
difficult to reconcile with the current realities of globalization, bioterrorism,
and post-Katrina natural disaster response.
In 1905, the Supreme Court decided the seminal public health law case
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, holding that the states’ police powers inherently
include broad public health powers:
[T]his court . . . has distinctly recognized the authority of a state
to enact quarantine laws and “health laws of every description;”
indeed, all laws that relate to matters completely within its terri-
tory and which do not by their necessary operation affect the peo-
ple of other states.21
In Jacobson, the Court upheld a Massachusetts law that gave authority to
local public health boards to order the compulsory vaccination of adults for
smallpox.22  Scholars have understood Jacobson as defining the maximal
limits of state public health authority, establishing that the Court would up-
hold the constitutionality of any state public health regulation as long as it
was not “arbitrary and oppressive.”23  The Court did not reach the issue of
whether forced vaccination was legal because the Massachusetts high court
had already determined that such government action was not permissible and
that the only legal sanction for noncompliance was a statutory fine.24
Fast forward to a century after the Jacobson case and it is hard to imag-
ine that an outbreak of smallpox would be construed as only a state, and not
a federal, matter.  In Jacobson, the Massachusetts statute provided that, “the
board of a health of a city or town . . . [if necessary] shall require and
enforce the vaccination.”25  Explicitly, this law incorporated the concept that
infectious disease control is inherently local, even to the level of a city or
town rather than the state or county.  In the era of Jacobson, if a steamer
bound for Boston left England with passengers infected with smallpox or
bubonic plague, the symptoms of these diseases would manifest before the
ship arrived.  Public health officials at Boston Harbor could then issue a
quarantine order for the ship, effectively dealing with the issue at the local
20 Id. pmbl. at 6–7.
21 197 U.S. at 26–27.
22 Id. at 39.
23 Id. at 38.
24 Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 722 (Mass. 1903).
25 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).
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level.  However, with the ability of individuals to travel across the world (let
alone state lines) faster than the incubation periods of diseases, it is easy to
see how an infectious disease can spread from Heathrow to Logan to LAX,
and to all points in between, in only a matter of hours.  The societal condi-
tions that existed in Jacobson no longer exist; it is difficult to see how a
potential outbreak identified at Logan Airport would not “affect the people
of other states” and hence implicate federal public health authority.26
Even in public health crises where the risk of contagion is nonexistent,
there is reason to think that the federal government would play a major role
in responding to a biological incident.  Imagine if the D.C. anthrax attack of
2001 instead occurred at a state capitol.  Aerosolized anthrax is not commu-
nicable person-to-person, but instead one must inhale it from a local source
of weaponized spores.27  In other words, there would be little chance of such
an attack infecting “people of other states.”  However, even under these
localized circumstances, it seems illogical to expect that state officials would
be the primary architects of a response to such an act of bioterrorism.  Cer-
tainly, the involvement of local public health authorities and emergency re-
sponders would be vital in such a situation, just as the NYPD, NYFD, and
Mayor Giuliani’s office played a crucial role on 9/11.  However, bioterror-
ism, like terrorism generally, categorically is a federal matter, regardless of
its geographic scope or intended target, because it raises national security
concerns.28  The use of bioterror agents implicates weapons of mass destruc-
tion and frightening technical sophistication that would naturally put the fed-
eral government on alert.  By contrast, a lone gunman attacking a state
capitol would not necessarily raise the same national security concerns.
Similarly, large natural disasters, like bioterrorism, can be properly
characterized as federal matters not only from a pragmatic standpoint, but
also due to the normative public and political consensus that the federal gov-
ernment has an affirmative duty to respond to massive crises that are
foreseeably too challenging for local and state authorities.  This consensus
began to build after 9/11 and was fortified during the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.  According to a bipartisan House investigative report on the re-
sponse to Katrina, the federal government broadly failed during this emer-
gency.29  In particular, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff
“executed [the federal government’s] responsibilities late, ineffectively, or
26 Id. at 25.
27 Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 2002: Updated Recommen-
dations for Management, 287 JAMA 2236, 2248 (2002).
28 Annas, Puppy Love, supra note 13, at 1181–82; Annas, Bioterrorism, supra note 14, at
1339 (“[B]ioterrorism is a matter of national security, not just of state police powers.  The
existing federal quarantine law is based on the commerce clause of the Constitution . . . and
Congress could examine and update it to deal with bioterrorism.”).
29 SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, H.R. REP. NO. 109-377, at 1–5 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf (“Our investigation revealed
that Katrina was a national failure, an abdication of the most solemn obligation to provide for
the common welfare.”).
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not at all.”30  Secretary Chertoff designated Katrina as “an incident of na-
tional significance” on the day after the hurricane made landfall despite ad-
vance warning of the storm’s magnitude and path from the National
Hurricane Center.31  Compounding this delay, Chertoff did not choose to
designate Katrina as a “catastrophic event,” which would have automati-
cally led to a more proactive federal response under the National Response
Plan.32
In some sense, the federal government’s forbearance during Katrina
could be characterized as respect for the states’ traditional police powers.
But, in the aftermath of Katrina, such an argument is politically untenable.
After being hammered by criticism that the federal response was slow and
inadequate, President Bush stated that “[f]our years after the frightening
experience of September 11th, Americans have every right to expect a more
effective response in a time of emergency.”33  President Bush admitted that
the federal government had failed to meet its obligation and that, as Presi-
dent, he was responsible.34  Eventually the federal government established a
very large footprint in post-Katrina New Orleans.  As described below, the
problem for many New Orleans residents then became not the lack of federal
involvement, but the unaccountable nature of it.
II. THE CONFLUENCE OF 9/11 AND KATRINA: MERGING NATIONAL
SECURITY AND FEDERAL PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY POWER
The similar ordeals of Javaid Iqbal and Abdulrahman Zeitoun illustrate
the danger of federal emergency powers that are applied in a context of
unaccountability.  Iqbal is a Pakistani immigrant who lived on Long Island
and was detained shortly after 9/11 on immigration charges.  Zeitoun is a
naturalized U.S. citizen of Syrian origin who lives in New Orleans and was
detained six days after Hurricane Katrina for “looting” a property that he
owned.35  While Iqbal awaited his trial, federal authorities placed him at the
Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), a prison that earned a reputation as
“Brooklyn’s Abu Ghraib.”36  Without charging Zeitoun with any crime nor
allowing him to call his family who presumed he was dead, National
Guardsmen and police acting under the authority of FEMA interned him and
three of his acquaintances at a makeshift prison called “Camp Greyhound,”
30 Id. at 131.
31 Id. at 131–34.
32 Id. at 36, 137.
33 President George W. Bush, Address at Jackson Square, New Orleans, La. (Sept. 16,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/16/national/nationalspecial/16
bush-text.html).
34 Id.
35 Ed Pilkington, The Amazing True Story of Zeitoun, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 12, 2010,
at 8.
36 Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Back Ex-Detainee’s Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, at
A16; Larry Cohler-Esses, Brooklyn’s Abu Ghraib, DAILY NEWS (New York), Feb. 20, 2005, at
36.
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which eerily resembled the fenced cage layout of “Camp X-Ray” at Guanta-
namo Bay.37  Credible reports corroborate both men’s claims that they were
physically abused by their guards, subjected to repeated unnecessary strip
and body cavity searches, refused medical care, and verbally taunted as be-
ing “terrorists,” among other abuses.38
Commenting on the type of abuse suffered by Iqbal and many other
Arab and Muslim immigrants, David Cole presciently argued prior to Hurri-
cane Katrina that, “[m]easures initially targeted at noncitizens may well
come back to haunt us all.”39  In the case of Zeitoun, one might counter that
even though he is a U.S. citizen, as an Arab American, he still qualifies as an
“outsider,” so his ordeal does not suggest that “insiders” would experience
the same violations.  As Oren Gross explains, during emergencies “[a]
bright-line separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ allows for piercing the veil of
ignorance.  We allow for more repressive emergency measures when we be-
lieve that we are able to peek beyond the veil and ascertain that such powers
will not be turned against us.”40
Returning to Zeitoun’s story, two of his acquaintances that were de-
tained alongside him at Camp Greyhound were white U.S. citizens who
spent six and eight months in prison while Zeitoun spent less than a month
in prison.41  Additionally, Camp Greyhound held over 1,200 detainees,
mostly African Americans, and de facto denied their habeas corpus rights.42
Thus, Camp Greyhound serves as a prime example of Cole’s claim that civil
liberties violations initially limited to “outsider” groups will eventually af-
fect the general population as well.
The Iqbal and Zeitoun narratives also illustrate that the Bush Adminis-
tration seamlessly applied abusive and repressive tactics developed for the
War on Terror in the context of PHEs.43  Further, President Bush did not
limit the militaristic approach to PHEs to the particular context of a physi-
cally devastated New Orleans, where one could legitimately argue that soci-
ety and government had ceased to function.  A little more than a month after
Katrina, President Bush stated at a press conference that he contemplated
addressing the looming threat of avian (bird) flu in the same manner: “If we
had an outbreak somewhere in the United States, do we not then quarantine
that part of the country? . . . And who best to be able to effect a quarantine?
37 DAVE EGGERS, ZEITOUN 232 (2009) (“Looking at it Zeitoun realized that it was not one
long cage, but a series of smaller, divided cages. . . . It looked precisely like the pictures he’d
seen of Guantanamo Bay.”).
38 See id. at 226–30; Cohler-Esses, supra note 36.
39 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959 (2002).
40 Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitu-
tional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1083 (2003).
41 See Pilkington, supra note 35.
42 Id.
43 See ANNAS ET AL., supra note 13, at 5 (“[P]olicymakers . . . view[ ] public health
policy through the prism of national security and law enforcement . . . [such that p]eople,
rather than the disease, become the enemy.”).
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. . . [A] military that’s able to plan and move.”44  Fortunately, such a mili-
tary quarantine remained hypothetical as an avian flu epidemic never actu-
ally occurred in the United States.
As a consequence of the federal government taking on a larger role
during PHEs and treating such events as part of national security, more at-
tention must be focused on the developing legal precedent regarding the pro-
tection of constitutional rights and the accountability of federal actors during
an emergency.  The two obvious goals of a federal emergency response pol-
icy are the effectiveness of the response and the protection of civil liberties.45
In balancing the security of the public with constitutional freedoms, one can
anticipate policymakers struggling with issues of both over- and under-pro-
tection of civil liberties during a PHE.  Political realists would argue that the
only limits on government during an emergency “are those emanating from
efficiency and limited resources.”46  At the other end of the spectrum are
those who argue that it is important to uphold legal norms during times of
emergency as a “check against arbitrary actions and unlimited discretion.”47
Certainly there is plenty of normative space between these poles.  For in-
stance, when a federal emergency is declared, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services can issue administrative waivers to unburden healthcare
providers from their duty to follow certain regulations such as patient pri-
vacy and facility certifications.48  Such waivers strike the right balance be-
tween acknowledging that emergencies require more flexibility and not
making any statement about derogating fundamental rights.
As the next section discusses, while the Obama Administration initially
signaled a dramatic break with previous national security policies, it is con-
tinuing many troubling Bush-era policies, and it is obstructing judicial
branch attempts to hold federal officials accountable for civil and human
rights violations.
III. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND PROSPECTS OF LIMITED
ACCOUNTABILITY DURING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
An expanded federal role during PHEs is such cause for concern be-
cause of the confluence of three political dynamics: expansive executive
power, lack of transparency, and lack of accountability.  The abuse of gov-
ernment processes and attendant abuses of civil liberties stemming from this
confluence during the George W. Bush Administration have been well docu-
44 David Brown, Military’s Role in a Flu Pandemic, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A5.
45 Even the MSEHPA purported to balance these two goals. See MSEHPA, supra note 4,
pmbl. at 6.
46 Gross, supra note 40, at 1042.
47 Id. at 1043.
48 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (Supp. I 2007).
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mented.49  On taking office, President Obama promised to bring trans-
parency, accountability, and the rule of law back to the federal government.
Obama underlined his commitment to these ideals by pledging to close
Guantanamo within a year and halt military commissions, among other mea-
sures.50  Yet, a year and a half later, the world is watching as the United
States tries Omar Khadr, detained at age fifteen, in a military commission at
Guantanamo while banning reporters from the trial for publishing informa-
tion that was already public knowledge.51
The counterstory, as even strong critics of President Obama acknowl-
edge, is that he “appears more reluctant to use these extraordinary powers
than his predecessor.”52  For example, the current “law and order” approach
to the cases of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, accused of attempting to blow
up a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, the
Times Square bombing suspect, represents a significant departure from
Bush-era practices regarding terrorism suspects.53  In other words, there is
reason to trust that President Obama will not arbitrarily invoke extraordinary
powers even though “he is nonetheless asserting, enthusiastically at times,
that he has such powers.”54
Crediting that the Obama Administration has been more restrained in
invoking extraordinary powers on national security grounds, what accounts
for the grave concern from groups like the ACLU that the current Adminis-
tration is “shielding Bush administration officials from civil liability, crimi-
nal investigation and even public scrutiny”?55  Could this simply represent a
political choice by Obama to look forward rather than backward?56  The
valid concern is that once the legal framework is put in place allowing fed-
eral officials to commit gross abuses with impunity, any future administra-
tion could abuse these latent powers.  As Justice Robert Jackson’s powerful
dissent in the Japanese internment case Korematsu warns, “once a judicial
49 See generally JAMEEL JAFFER & AMRIT SINGH, ADMINISTRATION OF TORTURE (2007)
(cataloguing, reprinting, and analyzing documents obtained by the ACLU showing that the
George W. Bush Administration prioritized security above civil liberties).
50 William Glaberson et al., Obama Will Shut Guantanamo Site and CIA Prisons, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1.
51 David McFadden, Pentagon Bans 4 Gitmo Reporters for Naming Witness, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 6, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/05/07/world/AP-
CB-Guantanamo-Reporters-Barred.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.
52 Eli Lake, The 9/14 Presidency: Barack Obama Is Operating With the War Powers
Granted George W. Bush Three Days After the 9/11 Attacks, REASON.COM, Apr. 6, 2010, http:/
/reason.com/archives/2010/04/06/the-914-presidency (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
53 See Jeff Zeleny & Charlie Savage, Officials Say Jet Plot Suspect Is Cooperating, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A11; Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Evidence Mounts for Taliban Role
in Car Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A1.
54 Lake, supra note 52.
55 Dahlia Lithwick, Torture Roulette, SLATE, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/
2238568/ (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
56 See Dahlia Lithwick, See No Evil, SLATE, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2210
915/ (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitu-
tion, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated [a] principle . . .
[that] lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”57
Given the reality that modern public health emergencies will be in-
creasingly managed under federal authority, and after the Bush Administra-
tion’s aggrandizement of federal power, it is important to carefully scrutinize
how the Obama Administration is defining the standards for transparency
and accountability for alleged violations committed in the name of public
welfare and security.  As explained below, the claim is not that the Obama
Administration is necessarily seeking to expand its own emergency powers.
Rather, the claim is that in advancing a legal framework of minimal or no
accountability for actions that relate to national security, the Obama Admin-
istration runs the risk of creating “a loaded weapon” of exceptional powers
that can be exploited during emergencies, including public health emergen-
cies, in the future.
A. State Secrets Privilege as an Obstacle to
Reviewing Government Actions
Providing government officials with tremendous power to control the
liberty of individuals during a PHE is rational in order to secure public
safety.  The government’s power to quarantine closely resembles its power to
preventively detain terror suspects.58  In both instances, the government
physically restrains someone suspected but not actually proven to be a threat
to public security before he can spread any harm.  However, removing ac-
countability from such power invites abuse, even from individuals who
might otherwise have a good moral compass.59  By advancing the “state
secrets privilege” in a series of high profile cases involving allegations of
torture and warrantless wiretapping, the Obama Administration is, in effect,
trying to cloak such abuses from being judged in the light of day.
The case of detainee Binyam Mohamed illustrates the peril of a govern-
ment having complete physical control over an individual with no external
oversight.  Mohamed was an alleged victim of the Bush Administration’s
57 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
Mariner et al., supra note 15, at 366–67 (“It is important to get the law right, because policies
governing civil rights become entrenched over time and shape judicial interpretation of the
government’s powers and individual’s rights.”).
58 Mariner et al., supra note 15, at 369 (noting that both quarantines and detention of
enemy combatants are marked by arbitrariness that invites abuse).
59 In Plato’s Republic, the philosopher recounts the parable of the magic ring of Gyges that
could make its wearer invisible.  The effect of this invisibility is that “the actions of the just
would be as the actions of the unjust.”  Plato’s parable further explains that with the power to
act with absolute impunity, no man could resist stealing, raping, or murdering to fulfill his
desires—that is simply human nature.  Plato, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett, trans.), availa-
ble at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.3.ii.html.
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extraordinary rendition program and was eventually released to the United
Kingdom with all charges against him being dropped.  According to press
reports, Mohamed suffered horrific torture.60  He and four other Guantanamo
detainees have been attempting to sue a subsidiary of Boeing for arranging
flights that were part of the extraordinary rendition program.61  The ACLU
originally filed this case in 2008, but Bush Administration lawyers blocked
it from being heard by invoking the state secrets doctrine.62  The state secrets
doctrine simply instructs that a judge should not make certain evidence pub-
lic if it threatens national security.  This interpretation of the privilege has
not been controversial.63  However, the Bush Administration transformed
this evidentiary privilege into a categorical bar to bringing a lawsuit under
certain conditions, including when the subject matter of the claim is a state
secret.
In the first months of the Obama Administration, to the surprise of even
the Ninth Circuit panel hearing this case, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
raised the state secrets privilege in order dismiss Mohamed’s case.64  This
line of argument prompted legal commentator Dahlia Lithwick to ask, “How
then, is it possible that Obama’s Justice Department chose to stay the course
on one of the most embarrassing legal theories advanced by the Bush admin-
istration—the . . . utterly bogus argument that courts are not fit to scrutinize
government wrongdoing?”65  The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s
motion, allowing the case to proceed, stating, “According to the govern-
ment’s theory, the Judiciary should effectively cordon off all secret govern-
ment actions from judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its partners
from the demands and limits of the law.”66
A day after the court’s ruling, President Obama retreated slightly on the
state secrets position advanced in the DOJ motion, stating, “I actually think
that the state secret doctrine should be modified, . . . right now it’s over
broad.”67  Subsequently, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memoran-
dum, effective in October 2009, that outlined the Obama Administration’s
new policy on state secrets wherein a team of career prosecutors and the
Attorney General must review and approve any assertion of the state secrets
60 See New York Times, Times Topics: Binyam Mohamed, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/m/binyam_mohamed/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Binyam%20
Mohamed%20&st=cse (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
61 John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at
A12.
62 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
63 Lithwick, supra note 56.
64 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc
granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009); see Schwarz, supra note 61 (recounting how the panel
was startled when government lawyer Douglas N. Letter advanced the state secrets doctrine
and argued that “[t]he change in administration has no bearing” on the government’s
position).
65 Lithwick, supra note 56.
66 Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 955.
67 Helene Cooper & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Voices Concern Over Pakistan and Defends In-
terrogation Memo Release, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A19.
\\server05\productn\H\HLP\4-2\HLP205.txt unknown Seq: 13 17-JUN-10 12:29
2010] Government Accountability During Public Health Emergencies 331
privilege before government lawyers could advance this privilege in court.68
By contrast, during the Bush Administration, a single government official
could invoke the privilege.69  However, it is implausible that under the Bush
Administration a team of government lawyers did not actually vet every as-
sertion of this privilege.  Substantively, under both the Bush and revised
Obama constructions of this privilege, the executive branch is claiming that
it has the authority to remove certain claims from judicial review.
Going forward, it seems unlikely that the announced additional safe-
guards will have a major effect on pending cases where the Obama or Bush
Administration has invoked this privilege.  For example, in In re National
Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, a case involving
the alleged warrantless wiretapping of a now-defunct Islamic charity by the
Bush Administration, the Obama Administration still invoked the state
secrets privilege following the Holder memorandum.70  Therefore, even con-
sidering Obama’s modified stance on the state secrets doctrine, Lithwick’s
earlier assessment that the Obama Administration has largely maintained the
legal position of the Bush Administration still holds, and the courts could be
left effectively incapable of scrutinizing government abuses.
B. National Security as a Shield to Bivens Liability
The Supreme Court case Iqbal v. Ashcroft71 and the Second Circuit case
Arar v. Ashcroft72 were both heard prior to President Obama’s taking office.
Taken together, these two decisions greatly limit the possibility of Bivens73
liability for federal officials engaging in conduct related to national security.
Of course, any conduct by a federal official during an emergency, whether of
the public health or military kind, could plausibly relate to national security.
The Obama Administration had the opportunity to distance itself from the
Iqbal and Arar precedents or even stay on the sidelines in the currently
ongoing Padilla v. Yoo case.74  However, the Padilla case illustrates that the
Obama Administration has wholeheartedly embraced the logic of Iqbal and
Arar in terms of immunizing federal officials.  The danger of this position is
its erection of a legal edifice that grants immunity for even the most extreme
violations of constitutional rights by federal officials during the time of an
emergency.
68 Carrie Johnson, Obama to Set Higher Bar for Keeping State Secrets, WASH. POST, Sept.
23, 2009, at A01.
69 Id.
70 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 VRW, 2010 WL
1244349, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (rejecting the government’s claim that the state
secrets doctrine barred plaintiffs’ claim, which made a prima facie case of warrantless spying
without relying on classified evidence).
71 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
72 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
73 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
74 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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1. Iqbal v. Ashcroft
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the
Supreme Court “recognized for the first time an implied private action for
damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitu-
tional rights.”75  Bivens was arrested following an unlawful, warrantless
search of his home.76  The Court allowed him to state a cause of action for
money damages directly under the Fourth Amendment, in effect creating a
judicial remedy stemming from the Constitution itself.77  The rationale be-
hind a Bivens remedy “is to deter individual federal officers from commit-
ting constitutional violations.”78  Recognizing the potential breadth of such
claims, the Supreme Court has advised that courts should (1) rarely apply
Bivens remedies in new contexts, (2) consider whether alternative remedial
schemes are available to plaintiff, and (3) examine whether special factors
counsel hesitation in creating such a remedy.79
Javaid Iqbal, whose plight was described above, filed a Bivens suit
against numerous Bush Administration officials, including former Attorney
General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, alleging that he
was subjected to harsh conditions of confinement because of his religion and
ethnic background.80  The Supreme Court dismissed Iqbal’s claim on non-
Bivens grounds, namely that his complaint did not plead sufficient facts to
demonstrate “that each Government-official defendant, though the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”81  Regarding the
plaintiff’s Bivens claim, the 5-4 majority opinion stunningly rejected the con-
cept of “supervisory liability” for federal officials like Ashcroft and Muel-
ler, reasoning that such liability is tantamount to respondeat superior, which
cannot form the basis of a Bivens suit because “each Government official
. . . is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”82
Justice Souter’s vigorous dissent warns, “Lest there be any mistake  . . .
the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is elimi-
nating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”83  Souter contested that the ma-
jority’s interpretation of Bivens was “uncalled for” since the defendants,
Ashcroft and Mueller, actually conceded “that a supervisor’s knowledge of a
subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that
conduct are grounds for Bivens liability.”84  In other words, the defendants
acknowledged that supervisory acquiescence to abuses by subordinates can
constitute individual misconduct on the part of the supervisors.  Procedur-
75 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001).
76 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
77 Id. at 397.
78 Corr Servs. Corp., 534 U.S. at 70.
79 Id. at 67–69.
80 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
81 Id. at 1948.
82 Id. at 1949.
83 Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
84 Id.
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ally, because of the defendants’ concession on supervisory liability, the
Court “received no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory
liability, much less the full-dress argument [the Court] normally re-
quire[s].”85  Further, citing a string of cases, Souter notes the obvious legal
differences between supervisory liability and respondeat superior.86
Souter declined to state what the “precise contours of supervisory lia-
bility” should look like in a Bivens action,87 but overall his strong opinion
suggests that supervisors should be held liable for abuses that occur with
their knowledge or approval.  Although Souter did not specifically say so, he
seems concerned that foreclosing supervisory liability, whether in the con-
text of a Bivens action or some alternative scheme, opens the door for fed-
eral officials to arbitrarily and abusively exercise power with impunity as
long as they have their subordinates do the actual dirty work.  The advance-
ment of such a norm is dangerous and clearly subverts well-established legal
principles, effectively creating a reverse Nuremburg defense for federal offi-
cials who violate civil rights during public health or other emergencies by
allowing them to use their subordinates’ conduct to shield themselves from
liability.
2. Arar v. Ashcroft
In Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit dismissed a Bivens action on the
grounds that courts should not recognize suits that might interfere with exec-
utive branch decisions involving national security.88  In particular, the court
held that claims implicating national security matters present compelling
“special factors” that strongly counsel against creating a judicial remedy.  In
this case, U.S. immigration officials detained Canadian citizen Maher Arar
at JFK Airport based on erroneous Canadian intelligence linking him to ter-
rorist activities.  An internal Justice Department investigation demonstrated
that, “after the [U.S.] immigration board concluded that Arar would likely
be tortured in Syria, senior figures in the Justice Department had directed
that he be sent there.”89  Through a process known as extraordinary rendi-
tion, the United States delivered Arar to Syria, along with interrogation
questions, where Syrian authorities “brutally tortured” him for nearly a
year.90
The Arar majority explicitly invokes a separation of powers argument
when it explains that it cannot hear a Bivens suit that implicates national
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1957–58.
87 Id. at 1957.
88 585 F.3d 559, 574–76 (2d Cir. 2009).
89 Scott Horton, Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Arar, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2, 2009,
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/11/hbc-90006024 (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).  The Canadian government issued Arar a formal apology and $11.5 million (Cana-
dian) in compensation after an in-depth government investigation confirmed that he was com-
pletely innocent and suffered inhumane torture while being interrogated in Syria. Id.
90 Id.
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security concerns because such a claim “operates as a constitutional chal-
lenge to policies promulgated by the executive” and “unavoidably influ-
ences government policy.”91  Judge Sack responds that “Bivens by its nature
authorizes courts to invalidate exercises in executive power” and that its
ultimate point is to “influence executive policy” by making “it more costly
for executive officers to violate the Constitution.”92  Judge Parker’s separate
dissenting opinion notes that the plaintiff did “not ask the Court to assume
any executive functions—to dispatch diplomatic representatives, negotiate
treaties, or oversee battlefield decisions,” but asked the court to serve as an
appropriate judicial check “to keep executive power within constitutional
limits.”93  Furthermore, Parker argues, the majority’s “deference to executive
authority, especially in a time of national unrest, turmoil, or danger,” has the
effect of “dissolv[ing] the very protections and liberties that the separation
of powers was intended to guarantee.”94
In sum, Arar sets the dangerous precedent that federal officials can be
immunized for even direct misconduct (as distinguished from the supervi-
sory liability theory in Iqbal) by simply invoking the separation of powers
and a plausible connection to national security issues.  Extension of this pre-
cedent conceivably means that any conduct by federal officials during a
PHE, which by definition implicates the executive’s national security author-
ity, may be beyond judicial oversight absent congressional authorization.
3. Padilla v. Yoo
The amicus brief filed by the DOJ in Padilla v. Yoo, currently being
heard on appeal in the Ninth Circuit, provides a window into the Obama
Administration’s theory of Bivens liability for official conduct that impli-
cates national security.95  As discussed below, the DOJ amicus brief em-
braces both the Second Circuit’s Bivens analysis in Arar and the defenses
proffered by defendant John Yoo.
Jose Padilla was designated an “enemy combatant” by the Bush Ad-
ministration and held in solitary confinement for nearly four years in a mili-
tary brig.96  Padilla alleges that during his confinement he suffered
deprivation of fundamental due process rights and “gross physical and psy-
chological abuse” tantamount to torture as a consequence of documents
drafted by John Yoo, who was then Deputy Attorney General in the Office of
Legal Counsel.97  The district court ruled that Padilla does have a recogniza-
91 585 F.3d at 573–74.
92 Id. at 602–03 (Sack, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 613 (Parker, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 611, 613.
95 Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (9th Cir. 2009); Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Padilla v. Yoo, on appeal from 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-
16478), available at http://www.concurringopinions.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/DOJ-
Amicus.pdf.
96 633 F. Supp 2d at 1012.
97 Id. at 1013–15.
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ble Bivens claim against Yoo because: (1) Neither Congress, President
Obama, nor any professional forum has provided an alternative remedy for
the damages alleged by Padilla.98  (2) The circumstances presented in this
case do not concern matters previously held to constitute “special factors” to
counsel hesitation.99  (3) Substantive areas of the law, including national se-
curity and foreign affairs do not counsel hesitation as “all of the documents
drafted by Yoo mentioned in the complaint have become public record” and
“[t]he treatment of an American citizen on American soil does not raise the
same specter of issues relating to foreign relations” that existed in Arar’s
claims.100
The DOJ amicus brief claims that potential discipline by a state bar
association, the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility, or the Office of
Inspector General all constitute alternative remedies for the damages alleged
by Padilla.101  Setting the alternative remedies issue aside, the main thrust of
the DOJ’s amicus brief is that courts should not recognize Bivens claims that
directly implicate national security matters, particularly suits that “intrude
upon quintessential sovereign prerogatives” that should be left to the politi-
cal branches.102  Thus, the DOJ brief clearly adopts the Second Circuit’s
holding in Arar that a credible invocation of separation of powers and na-
tional security concerns should categorically bar any Bivens claims.
Directly citing Arar, the DOJ brief further argues:
The specter of a Bivens action . . . could distort the discussions
[regarding matters of war and national security] and even deter
some officials from partaking in such vital deliberations at all.
Given these potential adverse consequences, such Bivens claims,
which directly implicate matters of national security and the Presi-
dent’s war powers, and which seek redress regarding important le-
gal and policy discussion and choices, should not be permitted
absent congressional action.103
Is it normatively wrong for federal officials to feel constrained by the Con-
stitution, even when considering matters of national security?  If such ac-
countability would tend to deter official conduct that results in torture or
98 Id. at 1020.
99 Id. at 1025.
100 Id. at 1028, 1030.
101 Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 21. But see Scott Horton, DOJ to the Rescue . . . of
John Yoo, HARPERS MAG., Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/12/hbc-90006
184 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“OPR rarely actually investigates even the
most serious allegations of misconduct, and almost never actually recommends any form of
discipline . . . . The brief’s reference to the Inspector General’s office is also absurd.  As OIG
notes, it does not even have jurisdiction to deal with legal professional staff at the Justice
Department—that rests with OPR.”).
102 Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 14.
103 Id. at 19.
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unconstitutional detentions, are these “potential adverse consequences” or
fundamental reasons why Bivens claims are recognized?104
Again, through the Holder Justice Department’s advancement of the
Arar holding in the Padilla case, one can see validation of David Cole’s
argument that once the government starts denying accountability for harms
inflicted upon non-citizens (Arar), that same logic will eventually be applied
to citizens as well (Padilla).  This gradual policy shift applies in the context
of public health emergencies, too.  The argument that federal officials need
to be unfettered by the threat of judicial review during times of crises is just
as persuasive with regard to a natural disaster or pandemic response as it is
during a military campaign.  One might reply that congressional action could
provide a remedy to check official misconduct during a PHE.  But then Biv-
ens claims would not be necessary if Congress always took such action.  As
Judge Calabresi argues in his Arar dissent, “The conduct that Arar alleges is
repugnant, but the majority signals—whether it intends to or not—that it is
not constitutionally repugnant.  Indeed, the majority expressly states that the
legal significance of the conduct Arar alleges is a matter that should be left
entirely to congressional whim.”105  What is galling to Calabresi and many
others is that even if one assumes someone like Arar could prove that he was
totally innocent and brutally tortured through the misconduct of individuals
acting under the color of federal law, no one in the United States would be
held accountable.106  Lastly, if the Obama Administration will go to such
lengths to defend officials like Yoo from the previous administration, will
they not do the same for their own officials alleged to have engaged in
misconduct?
104 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 603 (Sack, J., dissenting) (“Civil rights actions influ-
ence policy: They make it more costly for executive officers to violate the Constitution.  That
is their point.”).
105 Id. at 638 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
106 See also Hui v. Castaneda, No. 08-1529 (U.S. May 3, 2010), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1529.pdf.  This recent U.S. Supreme Court case held that
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (Supp. II 2008), provides complete
Bivens immunity for federal Public Health Service (PHS) officers and employees.  As a result
of this decision, PHS workers are shielded from personal liability for constitutional claims, and
punitive damages are unavailable for aggrieved plaintiffs.  The particular facts of this case are
very troubling, as it appears the defendant committed gross medical negligence in refusing to
appropriately treat a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee who subse-
quently died of cancer.  While in ICE custody, the plaintiff repeatedly requested medical atten-
tion for a painful penile lesion that was bleeding and growing in size.  A PHS physician’s
assistant and three outside specialists all recommended that the lesion be biopsied to determine
if it was cancerous.  Defendant, a PHS medical doctor, repeatedly refused to order such a
biopsy for nearly ten months, stating that such a procedure was “elective.”  After ICE released
the plaintiff from custody, a biopsy confirmed the lesion was cancerous.  The day after his
biopsy, plaintiff’s penis was amputated and he began chemotherapy which was ultimately
unsuccessful.
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CONCLUSION
The American constitutional and political structure has always empha-
sized that civil liberties are not absolute and must be balanced against the
need for effective and decisive executive response to emergencies and crises.
Invoking 9/11 in nearly every sphere of executive power, including public
health emergency matters like disaster planning and pandemic preparations,
the Bush Administration disrupted this balance to the detriment of civil lib-
erties.  Upon taking his oath of office, President Obama reassured the coun-
try that he would restore this proper balance, bringing back the rule of law
while keeping the nation secure.  Indeed, Obama “tapped for the most senior
positions in his Justice Department people who have been outspoken critics
of the Bush administration’s extreme and secretive arrogation of powers
. . . .”107  This is why it is so puzzling and disturbing that the Obama Admin-
istration is backing away from its initial promise and instead ratifying the
broad claims of unaccountability and secrecy in the name of national secur-
ity—a tactic that defined the Bush Administration.
There is no empirical evidence to suggest that the Obama Administra-
tion is interested in exploiting the context of an emergency, public health or
otherwise.108  Further, the high-level staffing choices of the Obama Adminis-
tration might suggest that its institutional DNA is committed to the rule of
law and warrants a reservoir of trust from the public.  However, whether
such trust is warranted is beside the point.  First, once these emergency poli-
cies are normalized, future administrations may be less scrupulous than the
current one and could use PHEs as a pretext to abuse the rights of individu-
als and groups.  Second, with four million employees in the executive
branch,109 it is impossible to believe that the President and his trusted top
advisors can control the actions of all their subordinates.  Third, and perhaps
most importantly, providing even otherwise just officials with tremendous
power and impunity inherently invites abuse.
Government misconduct, in addition to being a harm in itself, invites
mistrust.  Trust is at the core of effective public health efforts in which the
public voluntarily complies with government regulations and orders.  If a
government cannot maintain legitimacy and trust during a serious PHE, even
the most coercive actions might fail to secure the public safety.110
According to Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic, President Obama pays
close attention to civil libertarians that criticize his policies and, “according
to an administration official, finds this outside pressure healthy and use-
107 Lithwick, supra note 56.
108 For example, conspiracy theories such as those suggesting that the Obama Administra-
tion is interested in setting up “FEMA concentration camps” are correctly ridiculed as para-
noid. See Glenn Beck Program: FEMA Concentration Camps Do Not Exist (Fox News
Channel broadcast Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/08/
glenn-beck-fema-concentra_n_184692.html.
109 The White House, Executive Branch, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/ex-
ecutive-branch (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
110 See Mariner et al., supra note 15, at 358.
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ful.”111  This characteristic distinguishes Obama from his predecessor and
makes it even more imperative that the same voices that sounded the alarm
on the PATRIOT Act or the MSEHPA during the Bush Administration direct
the same healthy criticism at the current Administration’s theory of emer-
gency powers and accountability.
111 Marc Ambinder, The Rubicon of Indefinite Detention, ATLANTIC, May 22, 2009, http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/05/the-rubicon-of-indefinite-detention/18087/ (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
